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Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. 
 
“The first and chief design of every system of government is to maintain justice; to prevent the 
members of a society from encroaching on one another’s property, or seizing what is not their 
own.  The design here is to give each one the secure and peaceable possession of is own 
property.  — When this end, which we may call internal peace . . . is secured, the government 
will next be desirous of promoting the opulence of the state.  (Adam Smith, Dec. 23, 1762, “Of 
Jurisprudence”) 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Empirical evidence shows, and theory suggests, that the common law tends toward economic 
efficiency.1 While various theories attempt to explain this phenomenon, no single one is well 
accepted.  This article provides a simple explanation.2 It suggests that efficiency arises as a 
matter of justice seeking, as efficiency and justice wholly or substantially overlap.   Judges 
discover just and efficient common law primarily through the adoption of norms but also of 
intellectual knowledge. When neither is available, justice is more difficult to determine. Judges 
seek justice because justice-seeking is a social norm with its own sanctioning force.  Justice is 
sought but efficiency achieved because they substantially overlap.  
 Inefficiency is created by change and the faster the pace of change the less likely are 
norms and knowledge to relevant to determine efficiency to be available.  Thus the less likely is 
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1 The evidence is too extensive to cite.  Some of it is summarized in two textbooks, Cooter and Ulen 
(1997), and Posner (1992).  Skepticism is evidenced in a series of articles by Mark Kelman, who sees 
the proposition as ideologically based.   See Kelman (1988). The first attempt to provide an explanation 
can be found in Rubin (1977).   Other explanations have come from Priest (1977), Goodman (1978), 
and Cooter & Kornhauser (1990).   
2 Cooter has expressed the view also captured here that social norms explain common law efficiency 
(1996).  This view is also expressed in Zerbe (2001a).  The authors have arrived at this view 
independently.  
2the common law created in period of rapid change to be efficient or just.   Several examples are 
presented that exemplify this model of common law efficiency.   
 
II. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IS ENHANCED WHEN ITS DEFINITION IS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE 
MORAL SENTIMENTS 
A problem for the congruence between justice and efficiency is the arbitrarily limited definition 
of efficiency. Traditional efficiency fails to considers equity and more generally moral 
sentiments . Mainstream efficiency is defined by the criterion of Kaldor-Hicks (KH), which, by 
definition, eschews issues of equity and arguably moral sentiments, so that its perfect 
correspondence with justice is not to be expected.  Thus it is not difficult to find common law 
examples that are not KH-efficient.3
Efficiency becomes both more powerful, useful and accepted through expanding the 
concept of efficiency to include equity by which I also include moral sentiments.  This I and 
others have done elsewhere Zerbe, 2001a,,2005, Zerbe Bauman, finkle, 2006).5 I call this 
expanded criterion KHM, where the M represents moral sentiments. 6 KHM represents a version 
of KH that includes, inter alia, moral sentiments.7 That is, all goods, including moral 
 
3 For examples see Zerbe (2001a). The development of labor law might also be seen as an example of this 
(Lande and Zerbe, 1996) 
5 In the 2001 work, I use the term “KHZ” which represents Kaldor-Hicks-Zerbe. Subsequently, I changed 
this to the more appropriate term KHM. In the 2005 work, “KHM” stands for Kaldor-Hicks-Moral.  
6 Additional characteristics are (1) the use of the willingness to pay (WTP) for gains and the willingness 
to accept (WTA) for losses; (2) the use of WTP and WTA from a legal status quo; (3) the exclusion of 
gains or losses that are legally illegitimate, as with goods held by the thief, or that violate well-accepted 
moral principles (benefit-cost rationale is provided for this); (4) a recognition and inclusion of non-
pecuniary effects; (5) an efficiency test that is passed when and only when the aggregate benefits 
exceed aggregate losses so that (6) there is no use of the potential compensation test); (7) an assumption 
of equal marginal utility of income so that each person is treated the same; (8) the absence of reliance 
on market failure or externalities to justify the use of benefit-cost analysis; (9) the inclusion of 
transactions costs of operating a project; and (10) an understanding that the role of benefit-cost analysis 
is to provide information to the decision process and not to provide the answer. This list of 
characteristics is explored more fully elsewhere (Zerbe, 2001a, and Zerbe et al., 2005). 
7 KHM efficiency differs from KH by its clearer grounding in legal rights, by its inclusion of all 
sentiments for which there is a willingness to pay, by its abandonment of the potential compensation 
criterion for one of net benefits, by its reliance on transactions costs rather than market failure to 
determine where to apply benefit-cost analysis, by its inclusion of transactions costs of operating a 
project though not of the costs of institutional change,  and by its view of efficiency as a technique to 
provide information relevant to the answer, not to provide the answer. This view is essentially identical 
to the view that has been presented elsewhere (Zerbe 2001a) as the KHZ view.  
3sentiments, are to be treated as economic goods as long as there is a willingness to pay for them 
or a reluctance to give them up.8 As this definition is more inclusive of sentiments generally, it 
will better correspond with the requirements of justice and thus is more likely to be consistent 
with the common law.    
 
III.  Justice and Efficiency  
 
The following example is meant to illustrate the way in which KHM can amend the divergence 
between KH efficiency and justice.9 I shall say that justice arises from meeting reasonable 
expectations. Consider the location of a NIMBY, say a waste incinerator, in one of two 
neighborhoods; one neighborhood is rich, the other poor.  The incinerator produces undesirable 
environmental effects and no corresponding benefits for the neighborhood so that neither 
neighborhood wants it.  It is of course efficient to locate the incinerator in the poorer 
neighborhood.  The land is cheaper, and the willingness to pay to avoid it is greater in the richer 
neighborhood.  We can ask, however, if the poorer neighborhood should be compensated, 
monetarily or as with, say, the provision of a new park. Is compensation just?  Certainly it can be 
seen as just as when society in general feels that compensation is the right thing to do since the 
expectation will be one of compensation..  Traditional efficiency has nothing to say about the 
issue.    If moral sentiments are to be included, as required by KHM, then compensation is also 
efficient.   Sentiments about compensation are a part of justice and are a part also of KHM, but 
 
8 KHM differs from tautological efficiency, a concept introduced by Zerbe (1991) and Barzel (2000).8
Barzel (p. 241) explains tautological efficiency as a state in which "individuals must spend resources to 
discover inefficiencies and arrange to take advantage of their profit potential.  Suppose that after taking 
account of these costs, some of these activities are still found profitable but some are not.  The former will 
be eliminated whereas the latter will be allowed to stand.  The latter ones, however, are not worth 
eliminating .... It is tautological that ... given profit maximization efficiency will prevail." Logically 
efficiency should further require that spending on discovery  itself must be at the efficient level.  
9  Generally it is thought that KH-efficiency does not include an evaluation of moral sentiments.  
This view is an extension of Kaldor’s rejection of the consideration of distributional effects for 
benefit-cost analysis because of the mistaken notion that value judgments would be avoided 
by such exclusion.  Some have further claimed that to include moral sentiments can lead to a 
failure to pass the potential compensation test and to double counting.  These claims are, 
however, either incorrect or not a legitimate justification for ignoring moral sentiments 
(Zerbe, Bauman and Finkle, 2005). Rather, moral sentiments are fundamental to justice and 
should be for efficiency.  Indeed one can show that a Pareto improvement can be rejected by 
KH because it does not include moral sentiments (Zerbe, Bauman and Finkle, 2005).
4are not a part of a traditional efficiency analysis.  A project with compensation is thus different 
from the same project without compensation under KHM.  
Table One illustrates, from a benefit-cost perspective, the different analyses under KH 
and KHM of locating the incinerator in the poorer rather than the richer neighborhood. Table 
One assumes that the incinerator will be located in the poorer neighborhood.  Compensation to 
the poorer neighborhood and mitigation of environmental effects are possible in three of the four 
scenarios, but are alternatives (such that only one can be chosen in each scenario).   
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
BENEFITS AND 
COSTS 
No 
Compensation 
or Mitigation 
Occurs 
(thousands of 
dollars)  
(PV) 
Compensation 
Occurs 
 
(thousands of 
dollars) 
 
(PV) 
Mitigation 
Occurs  
 
(thousands of 
dollars) 
 
(PV) 
Neither 
Compensation 
Nor Mitigation 
Are Feasible 
(thousands of 
dollars)  
(PV) 
Benefits to Society 100 100 100 100
Ordinary Costs 60 60 60 60
Harm to Neighborhood  20 20 0 20
Mitigation Costs 21 --
Moral Harm to Non-
Residents  
50 0 0 50
Transfer Cost of 
Compensation 
- 20 - --
Administrative Costs of 
Compensation 
- 2 -
KH  NPV 20 18 19 20
KHM   NPV -30 18 19 -30
Conclusion Neither 
compensation 
nor mitigation 
appear 
worthwhile 
under KH, as 
moral harm is 
ignored 
Compensation 
eliminates moral 
harm, which is 
relevant only 
under KHM 
Mitigation 
eliminates moral 
harm, which is 
relevant only 
under KHM 
Moral harm 
renders project 
undesirable under 
KHM but not 
under KH 
* Note that not all figures are relevant to KH and that mitigation and compensation are 
substitutes, so that one or the other but not both are included in the AM calculation. 
 
5In column 1, the net present value (NPV) is a positive $20,000 under KH because KH fails to 
count the costs arising from moral sentiments.  The NPV of KHM is a negative $30,000. In 
column 2, compensation is made to the poorer neighborhood for bearing the environmental costs 
of the incinerator.  Moral harm is eliminated so that KH and KHM both give the same NPV of a 
positive $18,000. In column 3, mitigation is made that eliminates the harm so that again the NPV 
under KH and KHM are the same ($19,000). Under KH, however, economic efficiency will not 
lead to either mitigation or compensation as the NPV is greatest when nether mitigation nor 
compensation occur (column 1). KHM, however, leads to a choice of mitigation as this is the 
highest NPV including all sentiments.  If neither compensation nor mitigation is feasible, KHM 
suggests the project be abandoned as the NPV is a negative $30,000, while the KH analysis does 
not change. The Table shows that KH fails to convey relevant information.  KH suggests putting 
the incinerator into the poorer neighborhood without compensation or mitigation.   
 Moral sentiments regarding the allocation of rights and goods must be included as a 
matter of justice if we are to have confidence that actions that pass a benefit-cost test are to be 
seen as welfare-enhancing and just.  Without such inclusion, projects will be undertaken that do 
not increase net gains, counting the value of moral sentiments, and projects will be avoided that 
do increase net gains (Zerbe, Bauman and Finkle, 2005).  The simple moral rationale for benefit-
cost analysis (BCA) is that when it is applied broadly, everyone tends to gain.   Those that lose 
from one project gain from another so that applied broadly and over time the use of efficiency 
criterion in policy can tend to make social policy Pareto-superior. This is, however, only possible 
when distributional effects, the sense of fairness and due process are considered goods in an 
efficiency analysis.   Without the use of such goods in the analysis of efficiency, efficiency tends 
to separate from justice and it becomes less reliable.  In the example of the location of a 
incinerator, the use of the usual efficiency criteria will lead to the incinerator being located in the 
poorer neighborhood without compensation, with the result of further degrading that 
neighborhood.  The next time the city is faced with a decision based on willingness to pay or 
willingness to accept, the poorer neighborhood will be in an even weaker position to protect 
itself.  This can lead to a downward spiral for those less well off and vitiate the moral standing of 
efficiency.   
Justice is meeting reasonable expectations, and in a liberal society, reasonable 
expectations arise from existing rights.  Given existing rights, it will be efficient to incorporate 
6changes in rights that increase aggregate well being.  This is also a description of KHM 
efficiency.  It rests on existing rights and, when applied broadly, tends to increase the welfare of 
all, when welfare includes those moral sentiments that are also an integral part of well-being.10 
The simple moral argument for the use of efficiency to allocate resources is that its use has a 
reasonable chance to increase net wealth for the most people, particularly if applied with due 
regard for others’ rights and moral sentiments.  Losers from a project today will be winners 
tomorrow.  The benefit-cost approach, by definition, results in an increase in wealth across all 
projects that meet the benefit-cost standard.  As net wealth is increased, there is a clear potential 
for all to be winners; the systematic application of a net-benefits approach has some reasonable 
potential to satisfy a Pareto test at the end of the day.  
 
IV.  THE VALUE OF NORMS FOR JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY 
Reasonable expectations and thus justice arise largely from the extant set of rights and the 
perceived fairness of those rights. Making rights or ownership more complete for reasons that are 
well understood increases greater justice as well as efficiency. Ownership lowers transactions 
costs.  First rights tend to be efficient as they reduce costly conflict.  Second, rights rearrange 
valuations so that a change from them is less likely to be efficient. Ownership establishes a 
reference point from which losses are to be calculated by the willingness to accept (WTA) and 
gains by the willingness to pay (WTP).  Benefits and costs are measured, respectively, by the 
WTP and by the WTA under KHM as well as under KH.11 The WTP represents the amount that 
someone who does not own a good would be willing to pay to buy it; it is the maximum amount 
of money one would give up to buy some good or service, or would pay to avoid harm.12 The 
WTA represents the amount that someone who owns a good would accept to sell it; it is the 
minimum amount of money one would accept to forgo some good, or to bear some harm.13 The 
measure of loss from a change in ownership is properly measured by the WTA and the gains 
 
10 For a summary of fairness experiments, see Fehr and Schmidt (2001). 
11 See Zerbe and Dively (1994).  
12 These are non-technical definitions and, as such, are not wholly accurate.  The compensating variation 
(CV) is the sum of money that can be taken away or given to leave one as well off as one was before 
the economic change. The equivalent variation is money taken or given that leaves one as well off as 
after the economic change. See Zerbe and Dively for a derivation of these concepts in terms of 
indifference curves.  
13 The benefits from a project may be either gains (WTP) or losses restored (WTA).  The costs of a 
project may be either a loss (WTA) or a gain forgone (WTP).   
7from a change by the WTP.  For the same individual, the WTA for a good will equal or exceed 
the WTP.  Thus, the measure of loss from a change of ownership will tend to exceed the measure 
of gain, ceteris paribus.  
These representations of value apparently correspond with the associated psychological 
states of valuation.   From a legal perspective, the use of the WTA to measure losses and the 
WTP to measure gains rests on a normative decision to recognize ownership.  Ownership 
establishes a psychological state that efficiency must recognize because it is relevant for the 
calculation of gains and losses Thus efficiency corresponds with the psychological states 
associated with ownership--hat is with a set of reasonable expectations.14 
One’s sense of ownership will usually conform to one’s knowledge of legal ownership.  
Most people feel that they have a moral right to what they legally own, and do not feel that they 
have the moral right to something they do not own.  For most cases, then, the law will determine 
whether the WTP or WTA will be used even if the economic standard is psychological 
ownership.  The common assumption is that a choice based on assigned legal entitlements will 
usually be correct, but it is correct because of the correspondence between the legal and 
psychological states; it is not correct as a matter of principle, and it is incorrect in important 
cases.15  
Both efficiency and justice recognize legitimate ownership not only in the proper 
allocation of rights but in determining the calculation of gains and losses.16 For some time it has 
 
14 Kahneman et al., 1979,  1990, 1991a, 1991b
15 Levy and Friedman (1994, p. 509) incorrectly assert “the determination of the conceptually appropriate 
form of CV query is a matter of property rights, not economics or psychology.”  This implies that the 
law ought to govern in the event of a conflict between rights given by law and those recognized as a 
psychological reference point. The authors use the term “CV query” in reference to questionnaire 
studies.  “CV” here stands for “contingent valuation,” not compensating variation.  This result is 
contrary to economic efficiency.  Economic efficiency in the KHM form would recognize the 
psychological status quo as primary and change ownership to conform to it.  The psychological 
reference point is, however, not just that of the individual but of society generally, so that in so far as 
the law embodies the general understanding, Levy and Friedman are correct that the law should govern.  
Because the underlying basis is the general psychological reference point, however, where this differs 
from the law, it furnishes a guide for further development as indeed it has done with the development of 
common law 
16 See Zerbe (2001b).  This approach makes clear the irrelevancy of the critical legal studies objection to 
benefit-cost analysis as Heyne has shown.  The KHM approach shows the failure of the critical legal 
studies argument that the measurement of benefits and costs is incoherent.  Put briefly, the critical legal 
studies argument is that one cannot use the concept of efficiency without endorsing some concept of 
property rights, from which it is seen to follow that the concept of efficiency cannot be used to resolve 
8been recognized that the policy and welfare implications of any substantive economic analysis 
depend upon the legitimacy of the property rights that underlie the relevant supply and demand 
functions.17 Heyne (1988, p.11) notes that, “Because this legitimacy depends on existing law ... 
the foundations of economics may be said to rest in the law.”  The legitimacy of ownership will 
in turn depend on moral sentiments about what is justly owned and rewarded.  If the legitimacy 
of ownership allocations is then to conform to those suggested by efficiency, efficiency itself 
must recognize these moral sentiments.  
In a sense, this has long been noted.  Atiyah (1979) pointed out that David Hume and 
Adam Smith both said that expectations arising out of rights of property deserved greater 
protection than expectations in regard to something that had never been possessed.  To deprive 
somebody of something which he merely expects to receive is a less serious wrong, deserving of 
less protection, than to deprive somebody of the expectation of continuing to hold something that 
he already possesses.18 
The law has long recognized that it is more intrusive to stop an owner from conducting an 
ongoing activity than to prohibit the owner from undertaking the same activity if he has not yet 
begun it.  The currently fashionable expression of this may be found in Justice Brennan’s phrase 
in Penn. Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York,19 that a restriction is more likely to cause a 
taking if it destroys “investment backed expectations.”  
Norms confer a type of ownership status.   Thus they tend to confer the same benefits of 
efficiency and justice as legal rights. Thus legal rights that build on norms will also conform to 
both expectations and a sense of what is deserved and will a fortiori promote efficiency and 
 
disputes over property rights without begging the question.  Benefit-cost analysis takes, as does the law, 
the existing structure of rights as extant.  But there are disputes that reflect uncertainty about some small 
portions of these rights.  Benefit-cost analysis merely furnishes information relevant to the legal decision 
about the allocation of such a right.  Take a simple case: A change in technology makes valuable rights to 
the radio wave spectrum that has hitherto been unowned.  No party has a superior claim.  The assignment 
of the right to a particular party will be a gain.  Gains in economic analysis are to be measured by the 
WTP.   The WTP will in turn be partly determined by the pattern of wealth that rests on the existing 
system of rights.  Economic analysis suggests auctioning off the right.  The right in general should go to 
that party who would pay the most for it if transactions costs were zero.  Cases where conflicting prior 
claims exist raise more difficult questions, but these are answerable and elsewhere I have provided 
answers. See Zerbe (2001b). 
17 Id. at 53–71. 
18 See Atiyah (1979). 
19 Penn. Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  The author would like to thank 
William B. Stoebuck for this reference.  
9justice. .  When norms are well established, they are more likely to be efficient because the rights 
they establish will be more certain and accepted.  Those rights that are long standing are more 
likely to be efficient than when those rights are contentious.  Justice involves people receiving 
what they deserve and in meeting their reasonable expectations.  Thus, justice suggests that those 
who contribute more should receive more, as a principle of efficiency.  Norms will be more 
likely to be seen as uncontentious when they are seen as just and therefore as also efficient. 
 
JUDGES ADOPT NORMS AS COMMON LAW BECAUSE THEY SEEK JUSTICE 
Judges act according to a norm of justice.20 According to Glick  (1990), empirical evidence 
suggests that judges seek to do justice in deciding cases.  As John Chipman Gray (1909, p. 114) 
points out, “The essence of a judge’s office is that he shall be impartial ....”  A similar sentiment 
was expressed by the commission of four bishops, two earls and six other barons who were 
appointed after the triumph of Henry III over the baronial faction: “Furthermore, we ask the 
same lord king ... that, for doing and rendering justice, he will nominate such men as, seeking not 
their own interests, but of those of God and the right, shall justly settle the affairs of subjects 
according to the praise-worthy laws and customs of the kingdom” (Hogue, p. 67, citing Dictum 
of Kenilworth). 
Posner’s (1990) view of judges is not apparently at variance with the one expressed here.  
Posner (1990, p. 17) notes that Holmes’s The Common Law (1881) is an extended paean to 
judges’ skill in adapting common law doctrines to durable public opinion.  Durable public 
opinion, of course, is what we mean when we speak of norms. This opinion then helps to define 
efficiency, so that the efficiency of the common law, far from being unusual, should be expected.  
Judges act according to a norm — a norm that expects them to dispense justice;21 they use the 
language of justice.  I will cite one example among almost endless possibilities because, first, it 
uses the language of justice; second, it illustrates the regard for others; third, it shows concern for 
the income distribution; and fourth, it keeps with my custom here of using historical references.   
 
20 This view is not universal.  See, for example, Everson (1919) and Blanck (1996). 
21 The trickier question, of course, is what it means to say that a judge should “do justice.”  Under the 
jurisprudential doctrine of positivism, a judge does justice (especially in a democratic country) by 
following the “plain meaning” of statutes (Allen, 1992, p. 692).  Under the natural law and legal realist 
theories of law, a judge does justice by recognizing either transcendent moral values (natural law) 
(Pennington, 1997, p. 1097) or public policy and common sense (legal realism) (Allen, p. 692). 
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In Gilmore v. M’Kelvey (MacDevitt, 1884, p. 10), a case arising out of the Irish land law 
of 1881, the court writes, “With respect to the question of value, the court is perfectly 
unanimous.  One cannot help having a certain feeling with respect to a gentleman who having in 
1878 voluntarily and without coercion taken a couple of fields outside the town from a lady, not 
very wealthy, at a rent of £30 a year, comes in the year 1882, and seeks to get a perpetuity in that 
land as against her at a rent of £12 15s.  I have no doubt Mr. Gilmore reconciled himself to the 
transaction, but there are many people who would not” [emphasis added]. 
Attempts such as those of Landes and Posner (1975) to explain judicial behavior from an 
interest-group perspective are “simply unconvincing,” as North (1981, p. 57) and Buchanan 
(1975) have pointed out. As Hogue (p. 253) states, “When judges in medieval England failed to 
maintain the high standards of learning and disinterested action expected of them, English feudal 
barons, churchmen, and merchants insisted on reform.”  
Efficiency itself is such an important norm that we should not be surprised when 
impartial judges advance changes in rules that are efficient.  Gray (1909) argued that judges and 
jurists approached the law from the side of public welfare, and sought to adapt it to the common 
good.  Holmes in The Common Law (1881) asserted that when revenge was a prevailing 
sentiment, the law provided a remedy for a wrong that approximated what would have been 
considered necessary to give victims their traditional vengeance. Later, when revenge became 
less important relative to the values of deterrence and compensation, the old doctrines were 
ingeniously adapted to the new sentiments (Posner, 1990).  
 The relationship between the British king and the judiciary may explain the norm in part.  
Efficient norms that promote the wealth of a nation are likely to increase the sovereign’s wealth 
as well, and reduce dissention, and will tend to be then be left undisturbed.22 Thus, norms such 
as those requiring that debts be paid or that contracts be honored among citizens are wealth 
 
22 A full explanation of the origin of the norm that judges should dispense justice would require a 
treatise on English history, which I do not provide I will, however, note that a straightforward 
extension of the work of Weingast (1997) and of Calvert (1995) suggests that a norm of justice arises as 
an equilibrium condition in a “game” that produces stable democracies.  The equilibrium condition 
requires that citizens agree on the boundary of the state and that those boundaries be self enforcing 
(Weingast).  In a game-theory setting, this occurs when constitutional or other provisions are held in 
sufficiently high esteem that citizens are willing to defend them.  I note also that disturbing a norm is 
costly because it fuels opposition. 
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increasing, and will not be disturbed by the sovereign.  The sovereign’s judges have, then, an 
incentive to see that those norms become legally enforceable.23 
VI.  ADOPTION OF UNCONTENTIOUS NORMS IS EFFICIENT  
A norm is a set of rights or ownership established by custom.  A norm contributes to efficiency 
by setting or clarifying rights (Zerbe and Anderson, 2001).  When norms are well established 
they are more likely to be efficient because the rights they establish will be more certain. By 
definition, uncontentious norms are widespread, long established and without controversy 
(Blackstone, 1900).  Norms lacking one of these elements are contentious.  An uncontentious 
norm is more apt to be efficient than a contentious norm. Being without controversy such norms 
can reasonably be regarded as fair.  Property rights established under an uncontentious norm are 
likely to be settled, accepted, better known and clearer than those established under a contentious 
norm.  When uncontentious norms are in effect, it is less likely that an efficient rule change will 
exist.24 If a rule is uncontentious, it is settled and enforced through social pressure.  
A court that adopts uncontentious norms into the common law establishes legal property 
rights where they did not exist before and ensures that these legal rights correspond with 
established economic ownership. Suppose, for example, that the norm in a community is that 
group A has the right to collect driftwood along a certain beach to the exclusion of group B.  
Psychological ownership in driftwood among group A has been established.  In the absence of 
knowledge that rights have been mis-specified by custom, the assignment of rights to A is more 
likely to be efficient.  A’s loss — were the right to be assigned to B — would be measured by its 
WTA, but B’s gain would be measured by its WTP.  Even if group B were the least-cost 
collector, the WTP may be less than the WTA of A if the right has more than purely commercial 
value.  Assigning the right to A is likely to be the efficient assignment even if B is the least-cost 
collector.  First, to assign the right to B, without compensation to A, when it has psychologically 
belonged to A, will be seen as unfair by others.  Society members’ moral sentiment that the rule 
 
23 Myers (1971, p. 1) notes the puzzling fact that England produced a more stable democracy earlier than 
other European countries but also had a stronger monarch earlier.  This puzzle may be resolved by 
considering the role of norms.  A stronger monarch produces a more uniform system of norms.  This 
more uniform system will make it more difficult for the monarch to play off some groups against 
others.   
24 There is likely to be an exception to this statement when a rule change can harness the enforcement 
power of government and in this way improve on a norm. 
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change was unfair would be measured as an efficiency loss resulting from the assignment to B.  
Second, it will be expensive to determine that B is the least-cost collector.  The main role for the 
courts in this sort of situation is simply to specify property rights and thus lower the transactions 
costs of A’s selling the right to B, so that the right is more likely to transfer.  When the existing 
psychological ownership is accommodated, any transfer from the group with psychological 
ownership will be compensated, and thus will be more likely to be seen as fair.   
A court’s decision to reallocate a right away from party A, who holds psychological 
ownership, to party B would involve greater risk.  To determine that it is more efficient to assign 
a right to party B, the court would need to determine that the right was worth more to B than to 
A, and this determination would be both expensive and error-prone.  The court knows, moreover, 
that if it allocates rights according to existing social norms, parties will likely reallocate rights to 
resolve any inefficiency if transaction costs are low enough.25 The court recognizes that any loss 
caused by allocating the right to collect driftwood to party A instead of party B is limited to the 
transaction costs of transferring the property right.  These transaction costs are likely to be less 
than the costs of having the courts attempt to determine whether B is the efficient holder of the 
right.  Thus, granting the right to A rather than to B and following the norm is more likely than 
not to result in efficiency.  
 
VII.  THE COMMON LAW INCORPORATES LONG-STANDING CUSTOM 
To establish rights that correspond to economic ownership when conditions are unchanging is by 
definition efficient.  Norms that are uncontentious and long-standing involve the establishment 
of economic rights.  When law adopts a norm, legal ownership corresponds to and codifies 
economic ownership.  When conditions change, the common law seeks an efficient adoption of 
norms and may or may not find one, depending on the pace of change and the corresponding 
difficulty of determining the efficient rule.26 A wide variety of common law was developed by 
judges in response to such scenarios (Cohen and Knetsch, 1992). 
 
25 Transaction costs may be prohibitively high in the case of public goods. 
26Underlying this proof is a notion that preferences are to be taken as given.  It is true that in benefit-cost 
analysis, preferences are usually taken to be given.  However, efforts to change the law to accord with 
preferences may themselves be KH-efficient.  Underlying this proof is the notion that changing 
preferences to be in accord with the law cannot be described as efficient.  
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In his treatise, Blackstone (pp. 56-57) provided a list of criteria judges should consider 
before codifying norms into the common law.  Blackstone contended that norms must be long-
established and uncontentious before being incorporated into the common law.  According to 
Plucknett (1956, p. 308), the civilian jurist Azo was held in high esteem by Bracton, and Azo 
noted that “a custom can be called long if it was introduced within ten or twenty years, very long 
if it dates from thirty years, and ancient if it dates from forty years.”  This requirement helped 
ensure that the public’s willingness to accept the changes was greater than their willingness to 
maintain the status quo (Blackstone).  Blackstone suggested that prior to codifying a norm, a 
social sanction for failure to obey the norm should already exist in order to guarantee that only 
important customs became enshrined into law.  Thus, Blackstone’s criterion ensured the 
incorporation of only true norms, which are norms that are efficient.27 
Judges have historically sought out custom to incorporate into common law.  One of the 
earliest attempts to codify social norms was made by Lord Mansfield, who acted as chief justice 
of the court of King’s Bench in England from 1756 to 1788.  During his tenure, Mansfield 
adeptly incorporated the merchant law into the common law; thus fashioning what had been a 
body of special customary law into general rules within the common law (Hogue, 1966).  Hogue 
(pp. 248-249) noted that, “When a case touched commercial law, [Mansfield] saw to it that 
reputable merchants of the city of London formed the jury.  Thus he secured in his court the 
participation of jurors who presumably understood every detail of material evidence.  Outside 
court, on social occasions, he cultivated the acquaintance of merchants to acquire for himself a 
precise knowledge of their ways of doing business.”28 
VIII. INEFFICIENCY ARISES FROM A CHANGE IN CONDITIONS  
A law will be more just and efficient as it is more fit and complete.  A law is complete if it 
specifies all relevant rights.  It is fit to the extent that the particular specification of rights is 
efficient. . Consider a static society in which all rights are specified. By static society I mean one 
that in which there is nor change in technology, sentiments of knowledge.  This society will be 
efficient to the extent that transactions allow.  In so far as transactions costs can be lowered 
through private innovation or through government intervention, profit seekers will lower them, 
 
27 Again, Blackstone’s (1800, pp. 56-57) norms represent the ideal along a continuum, not a rigid 
requirement. 
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again to the extent that the transactions costs of political action allow.  Thus such a society is 
efficient in that it can be not improved upon.   
An increase in inefficiency, in such a static society with a norm of justice, arises from and 
only from changing conditions.  Again I refer to changes in sentiments, technology, or 
knowledge.29 The deterioration rate of a law or norm in terms of fitness and completeness will 
be a positive function of the rate of change.  Thus in a static society there is no increase in 
inefficiency and the base level of inefficiency is limited by experience.  Similarly, a rule that 
adopts uncontentious norms is almost certainly efficient, where conditions are not changing.30 
For example, suppose residents in a hot climate have no right to run noisy air 
conditioners without approval of their neighbors.  That is this law is complete.  Suppose it is not 
fit since   the aggregate WTP to run noisy air conditioners is significantly greater than the WTA 
payment to allow them to be run.  Overheated residents are able to purchase or obtain approval 
from their neighbors, but transactions costs are higher and the net social surpluses are lower than 
they would be if all residents had the right to run air conditioners.  In considering a challenge, the 
court will note that the custom is for users of air conditioners to purchase the right to run them in 
many cases.  The court, relying on custom, will then find a right to use air conditioners as a 
matter of common law and both justice and efficiency will be served.  
 Similarly suppose that air conditioners are a new invention and that the right to their use 
is unclear. The law is not complete.  In a hot climate, the likely custom will be that people will 
use their conditioners and complaints about their noise will be generally disregarded. Again the 
courts, relying on custom, would under traditional common law procedure create a right of use.  
Thus custom in a static society will suggest what changes are efficient so that a static society will 
tend toward efficiency.  
 
28 See also Plucknett (1956, pp. 350, 664). 
29 It has been suggested to me that changes in the extent to which foreigners operate in the 
society would also affect efficiency.  
30 Thus, Ellickson’s (1991) discussion of the conditions under which norms are efficient, and his 
discussion of why norms in whaling and norms with respect to wandering cattle are more efficient than 
other hypothetical norms, fails to recognize that, by definition, norms are efficient if they are stable and 
uncontentious.  Ellickson’s own examples, if read from the perspective illustrated here, demonstrate just 
this point.  His interesting discussion indicates why norms of closely knit groups may be different from 
those of more diverse groups, and why it might to better to belong to a closely knit group than not; but it 
does not explain why norms are efficient. 
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In a static society, better evidence will exist about which result among competing 
outcomes and legal rules is efficient.  Unchanging conditions over time will provide cleaner and 
less ambiguous information.  As society members gather knowledge about mis-specified rights, 
pressure arising from a sense of fairness and justice, as well as self-interest, will build to change 
existing rules.  Knowledge will become cheaper to acquire with time.  As the price to attain 
additional knowledge decreases, rules will be changed to reallocate mis-specified rights.  Judges 
will adjust rights at common law as a matter of justice so that society becomes KHM-efficient. 
The level of residual inefficiency in a static common law society that adopts norms will be 
limited by transactions costs that prevent an efficient trade.  If transactions costs are sufficiently 
high that no trades take place when the right is mis-specified, there will be no norm to examine 
and some residual of inefficient rights might remain.   
 
IX.  THE GREATER THE PACE OF CHANGE, THE LESS LIKELY IT IS THAT THE COMMON LAW 
WILL BE EFFICIENT  
Changes in sentiments, technology and knowledge create a dynamic world that 
guarantees both the existence and continual creation of inefficiencies.  With change, laws tend to  
become less complete and less fit.  A social change may render a previously efficient rule 
inefficient when the change results in ambiguous ownership, as with the discovery of a new 
valuable resource created by new technology or knowledge.  Similarly a change in moral 
sentiments may make a change in ownership efficient as when the exercise of a right that harms 
others is no longer seen as acceptable.  Thus, generally it is efficient to change the legal 
precedent only when conditions change.   
A change in conditions creates inefficiencies and a more rapid change will create greater 
inefficiencies.  A change in conditions implies, as North (1981) noted, a change in relative 
prices.  As relative prices change, behavior will change in response, as will the efficient 
equilibrium.  North explains historical change on the basis of just such responses to changes in 
relative prices.  More rapid change increases the pressure for efficient rule changes but may also 
increase the costs of discovering which rule changes are efficient.  Hogue notes that in every 
generation both lawyers and laypeople seem to have been drawn toward two desirable — but 
separate and contradictory — goals.  The first of these is the goal of permanence, stability, and 
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certainty in legal doctrines. The second is the goal of flexibility and adaptability, permitting 
adjustment of the law to social necessity.31 
The slower the pace of change, the easier it is for changes in custom to precede law.  The 
slower the pace of change, the easier it is for judges to accurately determine the social standards 
of the age and incorporate custom into law.  Thus, one would expect common law to be more 
efficient in a quieter age.32 
Efficiency in law is found through completeness and fitness. Inefficiency arises from a 
change in conditions that increases incompleteness and reduces fitness.  As conditions change, 
the law or custom loses both completeness and fitness.  The rate at which new issues are raised 
in a particular area of the law will be a positive function of both the level of incompleteness and 
lack of fitness in those areas of the law.  The rate of new cases will increase as the net gains from 
a change toward greater efficiency increases, and the law’s injustice increases.  As law becomes 
less just, advocates that seek greater efficiency and justice will have greater chances of 
persuading judges who value justice. If custom changes, yet has time to become settled and 
uncontentious, custom will be a guide to efficient changes in the law.  Otherwise, intellectual 
knowledge may be a guide.  By this process, judges adopting new law by adapting either new 
custom or new intellectual knowledge will tend to create efficient common law precedent.33 
31 Hogue (p. 8) also notes that “[t]he result of the pull in these two directions has been an unresolved 
tension between factions, parties, or groups of men; not always a tug-of-war between conservatives and 
radicals.  The dual objectives can exist in the legal thought of a single jurist.”  
32 It does not follow, however, that the common law should not be used in eras of rapid social change. Just 
as the common law runs into trouble during eras of rapid social change, so too would any other system 
of law that attempted to match norms and laws.  In a civil law system, judges are simply administrators, 
and play little or no role in creating law.  In such a system, it is the legislature that would run into 
trouble, as it attempted to find an uncontentious norm when no uncontentious norm existed.  If either a 
common law or civil law country attempted to ignore norms, this would create inefficiency, by 
definition. 
33 La Porta et al (1998) have found that law enforcement with respect to investor protection is stronger in 
common law systems: “there is no clear evidence that different countries favor different types of 
investors; the evidence rather points to a relatively stronger stance favoring all investors in common-
law countries” (p.1151).   Moreover, as La Porta et al note, recent evidence suggest that stronger 
protection promotes economic growth (p. 1152).  That is, in my terminology, common law countries 
show greater fitness with respect to investor protection.  This result is what we would expect if judges 
seek justice in common law countries, if we might also suppose that the path to justice through 
legislation is more time consuming than through changes to the common law, at least in situations 
where the adjustment to efficiency is gradual rather than heroic.  Legislatures are more likely to respond 
to interest group considerations than are judges that seek justice. 
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Custom has changed over time, and the law has changed with it.  Plucknett (p. 308) notes, 
“The Middle Ages seem to show us bodies of custom of every description, developing and 
adapting themselves to constantly changing conditions.” He continues, “Indeed nothing is more 
evident than that custom in the Middle Ages could be made and changed, bought and sold, 
developing rapidly because it proceeded from the people, expressed their legal thought, and 
regulated their civil, commercial and family life.”  
The more rapidly conditions change, there is less opportunity for uncontentious norms to 
develop and the more difficult it is for judges to determine what is in fact efficient.  When 
conditions change more rapidly, there may be no particular custom or norm that the common law 
can incorporate.  There may be, however, reasonable generalizations from existing particular 
customs that represent the reasonable expectations of rights-holders and that are thus efficient.  
There will also be general norms or general custom that can be applied, although it may be 
doubtful that a general norm will be superior if a particular norm exists. By “general custom,” I 
refer to general norms that may be regarded as principles.  Such norms may include an 
expectation that one is entitled to what one earns, that promises should be honored, or that equals 
should be treated equally.   
 When social conditions change, the analogy between past cases and the current issue may 
become strained, which may make it difficult for the parties to predict how the law will be 
applied to a current dispute.  The harder it is to predict how a law will be interpreted, the higher 
transactions costs will be, as lawyers and experts are enlisted as consultants (in the hopes of 
avoiding a lawsuit) or litigators (after a lawsuit begins).   
To substitute for loss of uncontentious custom in a period of rapid change, judges will 
seek evidence of efficiency in intellectual knowledge.  Such a source will, as with common law, 
be more reliable the more settled it is and the longer such settled knowledge has lasted.  
Changing conditions will increase inefficiency through incompleteness and lack of fitness more 
rapidly than custom or intellectual knowledge can answer for so that legal inefficiency increases.  
In the more modern era, when the pace of changes in conditions has been more rapid, greater 
reliance undoubtedly has been placed on judicial judgment of what is efficient, as compared with 
well-established custom in the development of efficient common law.  As Friedman (1959, p. 
26) notes, “Since the First World War the tempo of social change has accelerated beyond all 
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imagination.  With it the challenge to the law has become more powerful and urgent.”34 Today, 
courts recognize that the law must change in response to changes in sentiments, knowledge, and 
custom.  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court noted in 1997 that antitrust law must change to 
reflect “new circumstances and new wisdom,” and that the common law cannot remain “forever 
fixed where it was” in a previous era.35 The problem is that in a period of rapid change it is more 
difficult for a judge to determine whether sentiments, knowledge, or customs are changing, and 
to determine the course of their change (Friedman 1959). These propositions will be examined 
through the following case studies. 
 
X. EXAMPLES OF THE INTERACTION OF COMMON LAW AND NORMS OF JUSTICE 
I have suggested that the law achieves justice by adopting uncontentious norms.   I have 
suggested that the common law tends toward efficiency and that this tendency will be more 
successful in a quieter age.  Logic and analysis can be, and has been, imperfectly substituted for 
the experience of norms in the modern age where norms are less available, as seen in the 
example of vertical integration in antitrust law.  When economists and lawyers ignore 
considerations of justice, as when moral sentiments are ignored, the normative analysis is flawed 
and the correspondence between efficiency and the common law is less apparent.  This is 
illustrated by a consideration of slavery and of dueling in the antebellum South.  When no such 
norms are available, the efficient law is difficult to determine.  This is illustrated by the cases 
dealing with segregation and the law of nuisances discussed below.    
 
A. A Change in Knowledge: Antitrust Law 
Even though a federal statute governs antitrust law, it is generally accepted that courts supply the 
content of the antitrust law by creating an antitrust “common law.”36 In deciding antitrust cases, 
courts recognize that the law should change to reflect new economic theory and data.37 
34 Friedman (1959, p. 26f) notes the law’s response to some of these changes. Examples of common law 
adapting to change may be found in McPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).; 
Donoghue (or McAlister) v. Stevenson, [1932] All ER Rep 1; [1932] AC 562; House of Lords (1932).  A host of 
similar examples are mentioned by Friedman.  
35 See State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997). 
36 See Khan, 522 U.S. at 20, 21. 
37 See id.
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Changes in knowledge have made it efficient to change the law of vertical restraints.  In 
antitrust vernacular, a “vertical restraint” is an attempt by a manufacturer to control the activities 
of wholesalers, distributors, or retailers.  There are two basic categories of vertical restraints.  
First, there are price restraints, where the manufacturer sets either a minimum or a maximum 
price at which a retailer may sell its products to customers.  Second, there are non-price 
restraints, where the manufacturer limits the customers to whom a retailer may sell its products.  
Non-price restraints usually take the form of territorial restraints, where a retailer is given an 
exclusive right to sell the manufacturer’s product within a certain area, in return for promising 
not to sell the product to any customers outside of the area. 
Horizontal restraints, on the other hand, refer to agreements between firms at the same 
level –– i.e., two or more manufacturers or two or more retailers — not to compete. Like vertical 
restraints, horizontal restraints usually involve either price-fixing or territorial market divisions. 
 Although the Sherman Antitrust Act38 prohibits “every contract, combination, or 
conspiracy” to suppress competition, the courts quickly realized that every contract suppresses 
competition in some sense (because an agreement to sell 100 widgets to one person is an implicit 
agreement not to sell those particular widgets to anybody else) and that Congress could not have 
intended to outlaw every business agreement, or even every agreement between competitors.39 
Therefore, courts developed a “rule of reason,” stating that only “unreasonable” restraints — 
those that harm competition more than they benefit it — are violations of the antitrust laws.40 On 
the other hand, the courts realized that some types of agreements — such as horizontal price-
fixing — were so likely to harm competition that an in-depth analysis of each one was not 
justified.41 Such agreements are unlawful “per se.”  If it is proved that a defendant engaged in an 
agreement subject to the per se rule, the defendant will be punished, and cannot escape liability 
by arguing that his agreement had pro-competition effects.  In holding that a type of agreement is 
unlawful per se, the court is essentially making an economic prediction that the probability that 
an agreement of that type would injure competition is so much greater than its probability of 
benefiting competition that it is not worth the court’s time to analyze the competitive 
 
38 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2005). 
39 See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
40 See United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). 
41 See Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). 
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consequences of a particular agreement of that type.42 Therefore, economic theory greatly aids 
judges who must decide whether to hold a type of agreement unlawful per se.43 In characterizing 
an agreement as unlawful per se, the court is denying the defendant economic standing: indeed, 
Justice Harlan once noted in dissent that the per se rule is a “no trial rule.”44 
The first Supreme Court case involving a vertical restraint, White Motor Co. v. United 
States, was not decided until 1963.45 In White Motor Co., a truck and auto parts manufacturer 
placed both price and non-price restraints on distributors.46 The government argued that both the 
price and non-price restraints should be subjected to the per se rule, and the lower court agreed.47 
White Motor Company did not contest the ruling that vertical price-fixing was illegal per se, but 
it did argue that vertical non-price restraints should be governed by the rule of reason.  The 
Supreme Court agreed with White Motor Company.  Specifically, it held that because the 
application of the per se rule is a prediction that agreements of a certain type are almost always 
profoundly anticompetitive, the per se rule should not be applied to a type of agreement that the 
courts did not have enough experience to make a reliable prediction.48 In other words, the court 
decided that too little was known “about the economic and business stuff out of which [non-price 
restraints] emerge” to say with certainty that vertical non-price agreements would almost always 
harm competition.49 Therefore, the court remanded the case to the district court to determine 
whether White Motor Company’s non-price restraints could be justified under the rule of 
reason.50 Specifically, the court speculated that vertical non-price restraints, unlike horizontal 
territorial restraints, might benefit competition by allowing small companies to break into a 
business, and such restraints might be necessary to save a failing manufacturing company.51 
Four years later, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., the Supreme Court imposed 
the per se rule on vertical non-price restraints, unless the restraint was part of a consignment 
 
42 See Khan, 522 U.S. at 10. 
43 Id.
44 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 159 (1968). 
45 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).  
46 See id. at 257-259. 
47 See id.
48 See id. at 263. 
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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contract.52 Schwinn manufactured bicycles and sold them through retailers.  About 75 percent of 
the sales to retailers were characterized as “consignment contracts,” while the other 25 percent 
were described as “sales contracts.”  Both the consignment and sales contracts with retailers 
placed territorial restraints on the sellers’ ability to sell the bicycles.53 The court apparently felt 
that it had become familiar enough with vertical non-price restraints to make a reliable economic 
prediction about their competitive effect.54 It began its analysis by interpreting White Motor Co.
narrowly, stating that White Motor Co. extended the rule of reason to non-price restraints only 
when the manufacturer was a new, small company or a failing business, noting that Schwinn was 
neither.55 
In analyzing the competitive effect of vertical non-price restraints, the Schwinn court 
concluded that some small companies could compete with manufacturing giants only if they 
could offer dealers exclusive sales contracts which involved vertical non-price restraints.56 On 
the other hand, the court felt that “prudence” dictates that it would be foolish to allow a company 
to give a dealer an exclusive contract while retaining “title” to and “dominion” over the goods.57 
Therefore, the court compromised by applying the rule of reason to non-price restraints in 
consignment contracts, but applied the per se rule to restraints in sales contracts.58 The court 
justified this compromise by arguing that it was consistent with the “ancient rule against 
restraints on alienation.”59 The court dismissed Schwinn’s argument that its exclusive 
dealerships enabled it to compete more effectively with larger competitors, because Schwinn was 
not a failing business.60 
52 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1963).  In a consignment contract, a 
manufacturer delivers a product to a distributor, but retains title to the product until it is actually sold to 
a customer.  The distributor keeps some of the sales money for itself, and sends the rest to the 
manufacturer, at a previously agreed upon ratio.  See id.
53 See id.
54 See id. at 373-374. 
55 See Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 374-375; White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 263. 
56 See Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 379. This is almost certainly a misreading of White Motor Co., since there is 
no evidence that White Motor Company itself was a new company or a failing business. See White 
Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 263. The references to new companies and failing businesses were intended to 
be examples of situations in which the rule of reason might be satisfied, not to constitute an exclusive 
list. See id.
57 See Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 378-379. 
58 See id. at 379. 
59 See id. (emphasis added). 
60 See id. at 374-375. 
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 Justice Stewart, in a forceful dissent, argued that the majority’s reliance on an “ancient” 
rule to resolve a difficult antitrust issue was misplaced, because the fact that there was an 
“ancient” rule against restraints on alienation is of little help in predicting whether a vertical 
restraint will benefit competition today.61 He noted that, in any event, the “ancient” rule against 
restraints on alienation outlawed only unreasonable restraints, and therefore operated much more 
like the rule of reason than the per se rule.62 He agreed with the majority — and Schwinn — that 
being able to offer exclusive dealerships would be necessary if a company was to attract quality 
retailers and distributors, but he felt that whether a transaction with a retailer was characterized 
as a consignment or a sales agreement made little practical difference in the manufacturer’s 
ability to restrict competition, and therefore should not determine whether an agreement violates 
the antitrust laws.63 
One year later, the Supreme Court extended the per se rule to vertical price-fixing 
agreements, in Albrecht v. Herald Co.64 Albrecht involved a newspaper company that terminated 
a paperboy’s route when he charged more than the maximum price specified in its contract with 
him.65 Although the price the Herald set was not predatory, and the Herald’s low prices would 
obviously benefit its consumers, the court applied the per se rule,66 offering three justifications.  
First, the court noted that part of the purpose of the antitrust law is to preserve an entrepreneur’s 
independent business judgment, and that an entrepreneur’s judgment was restricted regardless of 
whether he was forced to offer low prices or forced to offer high prices.67 The court insisted that 
a firm should not be able to substitute “the perhaps erroneous judgment of the seller for that of 
the competitive forces of the market.”68 Specifically, a manufacturer might set prices so low that 
the dealer was unable to make a profit, or it might set prices that would prevent the dealer from 
offering essential services to customers.69 
Second, the court argued that the Herald could not justify its maximum-price-setting rule 
on the ground that it protected consumers from paperboys who themselves enjoyed a monopoly, 
 
61 See id. at 392. 
62 See id. at 391. 
63 See id. at 388, 391. 
64 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
65 See id. at 147-148. 
66 See id. at 154. 
67 See id. at 152. 
68 See id.
69 See id. at 152-153. 
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because it was the Herald that granted the paperboys a monopoly in the first place.70 In other 
words, if the Herald argued that an exclusive paper route gave a paperboy monopoly power that 
he could use to demand super-competitive prices, the correct solution was to refuse to give him 
an exclusive paper route in the first place, not to grant it and then make the additional 
anticompetitive act of price-fixing.   
Third, the court noted that a maximum-price-setting agreement might actually be a 
minimum-price-setting agreement in disguise.71 That is, a manufacturer might characterize 
something as a maximum price in a contract, but the dealers might realize that the manufacturer 
really wants them to charge that price at a minimum. 
 Justices Harlan and Stewart, in dissent, argued that all three of the court’s justifications 
for the per se rule were economically naive.  First, Justice Stewart pointed out that the antitrust 
laws are not concerned with protecting the independent business judgment of an entrepreneur 
when the entrepreneur is exercising monopoly power.72 In fact, the paperboy’s “business 
judgment” is less likely to be consistent with the needs of the market than the Herald’s, because 
a paperboy will complain about a reasonable maximum price only when it prevents him from 
charging a super-competitive price to consumers.73 Justice Harlan argued that, in any event, a 
company could completely eliminate independent entrepreneurs by hiring its own sales 
employees, and while such an act would not violate the antitrust laws in any way, it would be 
more destructive to competition than the Herald’s modest price-ceiling rule.74 Second, Justice 
Stewart asserted that a paperboy’s exclusive territory was most likely a natural monopoly, which 
was a product of the market’s inability to support more than one paperboy per territory, rather 
than a grant of monopolistic power by the Herald.75 Third, Justice Harlan pointed out that while 
it might be true that some maximum-price agreements are disguised minimum-price agreements, 
many maximum-price agreements are not.76 In deciding whether to apply the per se rule to 
 
70 See id. at 154. 
71 See id. at 153. 
72 See id. at 169. 
73 See id.
74 See id. at 160-161. 
75 See id. at 169. 
76 See id. at 165-166. 
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maximum-price agreements, he noted that the question “is not whether dictation of maximum 
price is ever illegal, but whether it is always illegal.”77 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.78 reversed Schwinn,79 and held that vertical 
non-price restraints should be subjected to the rule of reason.  The Sylvania court noted that 
Schwinn had been wrongly decided for a number of reasons.80 First, Schwinn ignored White 
Motor Co.’s warning that a per se rule was justified only when a court had sufficient experience 
with a business practice to make a reliable economic prediction about its consequences.81 The 
majority in Schwinn did not identify any new information that had not been available at the time 
of White Motor Co., yet it changed the rule.82 Instead, Schwinn attempted to resolve its 
difficulties by turning to “ancient” common law distinctions.83 Second, to the extent that there 
was data that was available to Schwinn that had not been available in White Motor Co., that data 
strongly indicated that a per se rule against vertical non-price restraints would be inefficient, and 
possibly even disastrous.84 Third, developments in economic theory after Schwinn strengthened 
the case that a per se rule against vertical non-price agreements was a mistake, and that a rule 
that distinguished between consignment and sales contracts was wrongheaded.85 In fact, it was 
the large companies with little legitimate need for exclusive dealerships that were most likely to 
be able to characterize their transactions as consignment contracts, and the small companies with 
a strong need to offer exclusive dealerships that were least likely to be able to do so.86 
In general, most economists became convinced that because interbrand competition was 
more important to consumer protection than intrabrand competition, a manufacturer’s interests 
were more likely to be consistent with the public’s interest than a distributor’s or a retailer’s 
interests were likely to be.87 For example, vigorous interbrand competition ensures that a dealer 
with an exclusive territory cannot exploit his monopoly power, because a consumer would turn 
 
77 See id.
78 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
79 Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365 (1963). 
80 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59.   
81 See Sylvania, at 47-48; White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 263; Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365. 
82 See Sylvania, at 47-48; Schwinn; White Motor Co..
83 See Sylvania, at 53; Schwinn, at 380. 
84 See Sylvania, at 53; Schwinn, at 382-394. 
85 See Sylvania, at 48-49; Schwinn.
86 See Sylvania, at 56.  
87 See id. at 52.  
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to a different brand name rather than pay super-competitive prices.88 Additionally, economists 
noted that exclusive dealerships allowed a manufacturer to eliminate “free riders” who might 
dissuade retailers from offering vital services and repairs, or from marketing the manufacturer’s 
products.89 As the economic evidence mounted that Schwinn had been wrongly decided, and as 
more and more scholars advocated its reversal, it became increasingly efficient to reverse the 
decision.  Because Sylvania explicitly relied on the expertise of economists, and recognized that 
it is desirable to change a common law rule when new knowledge suggests that the old rule is 
inefficient, Sylvania has been hailed as a turning point in antitrust legal history, and the 
beginning of modern antitrust analysis (Calkins, 1997).90 
The recent case of State Oil Co. v. Khan reversed Albrecht.91 Khan noted that none of 
Albrecht’s “dire predictions” of what would happen if vertical price maximums were legal were 
founded in fact, and that Albrecht had created additional problems.92 In essence, Justice Harlan’s 
predictions about the probable effects of Albrecht were borne out by the court’s subsequent 
experience.93 Albrecht actually contributed to the elimination of independent entrepreneurs, 
because it encouraged manufacturers to replace dealers with sales employees.94 Further, many 
economists concluded that Albrecht had hurt consumers, because a dealer was considerably more 
likely to set a super-competitive price than a manufacturer was likely to set a sub-competitive 
price, because the latter either prevented dealers from making a reasonable profit or prevented 
them from offering services that consumers desired.95 Also, Albrecht’s logical underpinning was 
undercut by Sylvania: because it was now lawful, in many circumstances, to give a dealer an 
exclusive territory, it seemed foolish to prevent the manufacturer from protecting consumers by 
setting a maximum price.96 Finally, the court agreed with Justice Harlan that the possibility that 
a maximum price was a disguised minimum price was hardly a justification for outlawing all 
 
88 See id.
89 See id. at 55.  
90 Id. at 47-48. 
91 See Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).  
92 See id. at 19.  
93 See id. at 19.  
94 See id. at 16-17.  
95 See id. at 17-18.  
96 See Khan, 522 U.S. at 14; Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36; Albrecht, 390 U.S. 145. 
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maximum-price agreements.97 Under the rule of reason, the court could identify any alleged 
maximum-price agreement that was actually a minimum-price agreement.98 
In conclusion, a survey of the line of antitrust cases dealing with vertical restraints 
reveals two changes over time.  First, there is a shift in the Supreme Court’s attitude toward the 
significance of new economic knowledge.99 Schwinn quite consciously chose an “ancient” rule 
to draw a line on a difficult economic issue, and turned its back on recent economic 
knowledge.100 Albrecht similarly cited a “noneconomic” concern: protecting the independent 
business judgment of dealers.101 Sylvania and Khan, in contrast, recognized the importance of 
new economic knowledge, because the decision whether to apply the per se rule is an economic 
prediction about an activity’s impact on the marketplace.102 Second, there was an increase in the 
availability and prominence of economic literature discussing antitrust law.  In fairness to the 
Schwinn court, the volume of economic literature that was available to assist courts in deciding 
whether to extend the per se rule was much smaller than it was at the time of Sylvania. Indeed, 
Schwinn itself provoked a great deal of the economic literature relied upon in Sylvania.103 
B.  A CHANGE IN SENTIMENT — THE EXAMPLES OF SLAVERY, DUELING AND SEGREGATION 
It is easy to find examples where the common law is efficient,104 but it is almost as easy to find 
examples where it is not.105 The following examples discuss the difficult formation of common 
law under changing conditions.  The first, dealing with the law of dueling, shows the relationship 
 
97 See Khan, at 17; Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 165-166. 
98 See Khan, at 17. 
99 It is worth noting that in the early cases there are virtually no references to the economic literature, 
while the later cases are peppered with them. 
100 See Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 380. 
101 See Albrecht, 522 U.S. at 152, 158. In fact, the existence value of independent businesspeople is an 
“economic” good, but Albrecht does not discuss the value of independent business judgment in 
economic terms. See id.
102 See Khan, at 21; Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54. 
103 See Sylvania, at 47-48; Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365.  
104 For example, the general common law rule that a landowner is not liable for negligently harming a 
trespasser is probably efficient.  The exceptions where a landowner is liable to a trespasser are probably 
efficient as well. 
105 The law of mining and significant pieces of labor law come to mind (Lande and Zerbe, 1996). 
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between changes in sentiments and changes in law.106 The second shows the attempt of the court 
to craft an efficient rule to deal with changing sentiments about the importance of sunlight and 
changing technology for converting sunlight into energy.  The third example, the development 
and demise of the “separate but equal” standard in segregation, demonstrates the relationship 
between changing sentiments, shifts in the regard for others, and changes in law. There is an 
entire class of examples in which economists’ judgments about efficiency are flawed because 
they ignore the sentiments of those not directly affected, the sentiments of third parties.  These 
include the efficiency of rape, abortion, dueling and slavery.  I consider the examples of slavery, 
dueling and segregation below.  
 
1.  Slavery  
 In response to criticism from Dworkin, Posner (1980) has offered the defense of 
efficiency that it probably condemns slavery as inefficient, because a person could, if he chose, 
be more productive in the sense of producing a greater physical output as a free person than as a 
slave.107 This argument is both technically incorrect and misguided.   
It is technically incorrect as it ignores those sentiments that must be taken into account in 
determining efficiency, even if we confine ourselves to the sentiments of the slave and of the 
owner, and ignore the regard for others. Consider, first, only the transactions between the slave 
and the owner. Imagine that the status quo position is one of slavery. The efficiency question is, 
then, whether the WTP of the slave is greater than the WTA of the owner. Even if the slave 
could be more productive free, and capital markets were perfect, so that the slave can borrow 
against future earnings, we cannot say whether the WTP of the slave would be greater than the 
WTA of the owner. The owner may have a taste for owning a slave and may be willing to suffer 
the financial loss inherent in retaining the slave because the psychological gain is greater than the 
 
106 An ongoing change in sentiments is happily reflected in Sen’s (1999, pp. 20, 104-107) criticism of 
values that have led to the phenomenon of “missing women,” women in developing countries whose 
survival has not been given proper weight.  
107 For example, see Posner (1980, pp. 501-502). Posner notes (1980, p. 1), “ For example, if we started 
with a society where one person owned all the others, soon most of the others would have bought their 
freedom from that person because their output would be greater as free individuals than as slaves, 
enabling them to pay more for the right to their labor than that right was worth to the slave owner.”  
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financial loss. Posner’s mistake arises partly from his focus on efficiency in terms of mainly 
material wealth, but primarily from ignoring the regard for others.108 
The fact is that one cannot maintain that slavery — at least by the 1850s in the United 
States – was efficient on the basis of available evidence, Professors Fogel and Engerman 
notwithstanding. Professors Fogel and Engerman109 maintain that slavery was efficient, but what 
they show, instead, is that it was economically viable. They answer in the negative the question 
“If slavery had been eliminated, would the GNP have been greater?” I see no reason to doubt 
their answer.  
But to determine whether slavery was efficient is a different question from the one Fogel 
and Engerman, as well as Posner, addressed. A different question would have had to be asked 
and answered: “Would the WTP of those opposed to slavery have been greater than the WTA of 
slaveholders?”110 To this question no answer has been provided. That slavery might not have 
been efficient is suggested when we consider the sentiments of others, and the social antipathy to 
it that was already growing.111 One cannot imagine that the practice would have survived the 
turn of the century, even without the Civil War.  
 
2.  Dueling and Economic Efficiency 
The social convention of dueling in the antebellum South has been held by Schwartz et al. (1984) 
to have been an efficient norm.  The offered proof, which consists of pointing out elements of 
efficiency in the practice, cannot, however, be accepted, under either wealth maximization or 
KHM, because its definition of efficiency does not take into account moral sentiments (what I 
 
108 Similar criticisms can be made about Posner’s discussion of rape. The regard for others is, however, 
recognized by Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed (1972, pp. 1089, 1112). They note at 1112, “[I]f 
Taney is allowed to sell himself into slavery, or to take undue risks of becoming penniless, or to sell a 
kidney, Marshall may be harmed, simply because he is a sensitive man who is made unhappy by seeing 
slaves, paupers or persons who die because they sold a kidney” (p. 1112). 
109 See Fogel and Engermann (1974).  
110 If the possession of slaves is regarded as a matter of rights in dispute, the WTA of both parties will 
also play a role, as I showed earlier. 
111 Uncle Tom’s Cabin was the greatest fiction success of the nineteenth century. Alfred Kazin, 
Introduction to Uncle Tom’s Cabin, vi (Bantam Books ed., 1981). It was not for nothing that President 
Lincoln greeted Mrs. Stowe as “the little woman who wrote the book that made this great war” (Kazin, 
p. ix). Kazin also notes that “Mrs. Stowe had brought to her indictment of slavery … a moral passion 
that in the book is the most powerful antagonist of slavery and one that so worked on people’s feelings 
from 1852 to the end of the Civil War that no other single book can be said to have contributed so much 
to the end of slavery” (Kazin, p. viii).  
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have called the regard of others (Zerbe, 2001)).  The problem that Schwartz et al. does not 
overcome is that dueling, even in the antebellum South, was a contentious norm.  Its efficiency 
cannot therefore be proved without a closer examination of the regard for others; the sentiments 
of the general population need to be determined through a detailed evaluation. 
 The evidence suggests that the sentiments against dueling were considerable. Schwartz 
et al. (p. 326) note that “one other important feature of the larger social context was that the duel 
was explicitly made illegal and subjected to severe penalties.”  The laws were, in fact, carefully 
designed to eliminate the practice.  This contention was not confined to the antebellum South. In 
England, for example, there was never a time when private dueling was legal, according to 
Bothwick.112 From a KHM perspective, what is of interest is why the practice of dueling arose 
and why it waned.  
Trial by combat was a part of the legal system in England only after the time of William 
the Conqueror (Neilson, 1891).  It arose, in large part, in response to widespread perjury, and 
from reasoning apparently from the elite that it was better to risk one’s body than one’s soul 
(Neilson).  Possibly, in a more Christian period, it was felt that God gave victory to the right, 
although — somewhat ironically — the Christian church was actually attempting to abolish 
dueling.  As Gibbon (1899, p. 552) noted, “Is it not true that the event both of national wars and 
of private combat is directed by the judgment of God? And does not Providence award the 
victory to the juster cause.”  From the Crown’s point of view, dueling was narrowly efficient, in 
that it seems to have brought more money into the treasury (Neilson).  In England, probably from 
the time after the reign of Henry I, there was no battle in civil cases unless the property in dispute 
was worth at least ten shillings (Neilson).  In Scotland, however, which the English considered to 
be a more primitive country, parties had recourse to “cold iron” even in disputes concerning the 
most trivial property (Bothwick, 1776).  “In a rude age, this method of proceeding was 
exceedingly natural” (Bothwick, p. 8, note 157). 
A change in sentiments played a role in the decline of dueling.113 The practice was never 
universal (Neilson).  It was not practiced by the Greeks or the Egyptians, nor was it part of the 
 
112 Bothwick (1776, p. 19) notes, “That although, in times of ignorance, our ancestors had recourse to a 
blind method of trial by duels, yet there never was a period in the annals of Britain, when duels could be 
lawfully engaged in by private parties.”  
113 A similar experience may be seen in the history of flogging in the British Navy.  “Flogging around the 
fleet disappeared by the mid-1800s, and by 1870 a captain’s right to order flogging was severely 
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Roman codes or the treatises of their jurists.  In Europe, from its earliest days, the influence of 
the Christian church was directed against trial by combat, and seems to have been in the main 
directed against it during succeeding centuries (Neilson).  Clearly, by the late 18th century the 
practice was regarded with repugnance (Neilson). Neilson (p. 3) notes that “its roots must be 
sought in lands inhabited by a people not yet advanced beyond the barbarian stage.”  There was a 
steady process of restriction of trial by battle to the writ and the appeal of felony.  By 1219, a 
rigid line had formed around the duel which it could not pass: “In burgh after burgh it passed 
away ... in the other courts in which it was competent, the judges more and more found reasons 
and made them, for disallowing a mode of trial in which they could have little faith, and in which 
the people at large by no means loved .… When the century ended, trial by battle was far 
advanced on the high road to extinction. It had become uncommon before the close of the reign 
of Henry VI” (Neilson, p. 72). 
In the South after the Civil War, the value of honor probably declined.  A similar 
explanation may apply to England and Scotland.  Bothwick (p. 8) notes that “Expressions which 
go for nothing in the year 1776 would not have gone for nothing in the year 1400. In proportion 
as honesty is become rare, a sense of personal honour is become less delicate.” Thus without 
taking into account the change in sentiments,  Schwartz et al cannot prove that dueling was 
efficient.  
 
2. Plessy v. Ferguson: A Misapplication of the Common Law Tradition and the Difficulty of 
Determining Efficiency in the Absence of a Uncontentious Norm  
 
The common law tradition of using social norms to create law is not invariably efficient, and it is 
particularly likely to be inefficient if the norm is contentious.  As Blackstone (p. 43f) noted, a 
norm is an efficient tool in creating law only when the norm is uncontentious.  An example is 
found in the famous case of Plessy v. Ferguson.114 Plessy bungled the common law tradition in 
three ways: 1) it adopted a “norm” that lacked sufficient support; 2) it adopted a “norm” when a 
 
restricted. In 1879 it was abolished,” according to Massie (1991). 
114 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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competing norm existed; and 3) it adopted a “norm” that ultimately lost out to a competing 
norm.115 The Plessy court faced a situation where no uncontentious norm existed.  
Plessy upheld a Louisiana statute that provided for “separate but equal” accommodations 
for white and African-American train passengers, and provided for fines and imprisonment of 
passengers and train employees who refused to comply with the rules.116 Contrary to popular 
belief, Plessy did not require that the facilities for whites and African Americans be equal; it held 
that a racially discriminatory law is constitutional if it is “reasonable” in light of the “established 
usages, customs, and traditions of the people.”117 Because the statute was consistent with 
Louisiana’s “social conventions,” the statute was held constitutional.118 Clearly the Plessy 
decision was norm-seeking. 
Justice Harlan argued in dissent that the “reasonableness” of the statute in light of 
Louisiana’s “social conventions” was irrelevant.119 At first glance, this appears to be a rejection 
of the common law tradition; if so, his dissent would be of little use in determining the efficiency 
of Plessy.120 However, Justice Harlan’s opinion makes it clear that it is not Louisiana’s social 
conventions that are relevant, but those of the United States.121 Thus, the Fourteenth 
Amendment renders Louisiana’s policies unconstitutional.122 Using the language of KHM, 
Justice Harlan argued that Louisiana’s custom of segregation should not be considered, because 
the United States had made a reasonable social judgment that the costs of governmental racial 
discrimination outweigh any benefits the citizens of the state would receive from it.123 Just as a 
thief lacks standing to argue that his WTP for stolen goods is higher than his victim’s WTA, 
 
115 Id. 
116 See id. at 541, 550-551. 
117 See id. at 550-551. 
118 See id. Justice Harlan points out, in dissent, that racial segregation was not Louisiana’s social 
convention in any event, because it prevented an African-American servant from waiting on a white 
patron during the ride, something that Louisiana’s social conventions not only allowed but demanded of 
African Americans.  See id. at 553.  The point is not that a norm of servitude is morally superior to a 
norm of segregation, but merely that the alleged norm of segregation was not even historically accurate. 
119 See id. at 550-551, 557. 
120 Id. 
121 See id. at 554.  Justice Harlan notes, “[T]he Constitution of the United States does not, I think, permit 
any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of 
[constitutional] rights.”  See id. at 554.  Saying that a public authority may not “know” a certain fact 
when making a decision is an apt description of what it means to deny economic standing. 
122 See id.
123 See id. at 555. 
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Louisiana lacked standing to argue that its statute is efficient because of its consistency with 
Louisiana’s norms. 
 The majority in Plessy at least partially recognized the legitimacy of Justice Harlan’s 
argument, in that it attempted to formulate a norm that justifies Louisiana’s statute but that is 
consistent with the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment.124 The majority argued that racial 
integration is only appropriate when it is “voluntary” and a product of “a mutual appreciation of 
each other’s merits.”125 This argument was incoherent, however, because Louisiana’s statute 
provided for fines and imprisonment if a white and an African-American passenger decided to sit 
together because they had a “mutual appreciation of each other’s merits.”126 The majority’s 
incoherence was inevitable, because there was no norm that justified Louisiana’s statute that was 
consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.127 
Plessy improperly applied a norm that lacked the uncontentious quality required by 
Blackstone.  At the time of Plessy, there were competing norms of racial integration and racial 
segregation, and neither norm was sufficiently “uncontentious” to guarantee efficiency.128 
Furthermore, the norm Plessy attempted to establish did not become uncontentious over 
time.129 In fact, support for Plessy’s norm evaporated, leading the Supreme Court to back away 
from its holding.130 In Ex Rel Gaines v. Canada, the Supreme Court held that it was 
unconstitutional for Missouri to provide for a legal education for African Americans by 
subsidizing their tuition to attend law school in an adjacent state.131 In Gaines, the majority 
demanded that the privilege of education be extended to all races on an “equal” basis, while the 
dissent insisted that the question was merely whether the state had made a “reasonable” effort to 
provide “specialized education” to African Americans.132 The dissent’s approach was probably 
 
124 See id. at 550-551.  For a discussion of the thief example, see Zerbe (2001a) and Cooter and Ulen 
(1997).  
125 See Plessy, at 550-551. 
126 See id.
127 See id. at 551, 557. 
128 At a minimum, Harlan’s eloquent dissent provides an example of one competing norm. See id. at 552-
564. 
129 Id.
130 Id. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt, 339
U.S. 629 (1950); Gaines, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
131 See Gaines, 305 U.S. at 342, 349-352. 
132 See id., at 349, 353. 
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more consistent with Plessy’s “reasonableness” standard than was the majority’s approach, but 
after Gaines “reasonableness” was not enough.133 
Sweatt v. Painter involved Texas’ attempt to maintain the all-white status of the 
University of Texas Law School by creating a smaller, adjacent law school for African 
Americans, with many of the same faculty and textbooks.134 The majority of the Supreme Court 
held that this “separate” school was not “equal.”135 While the Sweatt court could have relied on 
the tangible inferiority of the African-American law school, it instead focused on the 
“intangible” factors such as “reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position 
and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige.”136 While 
Sweatt recognized the theoretical possibility of a separate law school that was equal to the white 
one, it is hard to imagine how any non-white school — which in Texas would necessarily be a 
new law school — could have alumni of equal “influence,” or comparable community standing 
and “prestige.”137 
The court in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education held that an 
integrated graduate school of education had violated the Fourteenth Amendment, even though it 
had admitted an African American into its department, because it forced him to sit in a 
designated row in the classrooms, and in a designated table in the cafeteria and in the library.138 
McLaurin’s education would have been as “equal” to that received by the white students as any 
separate education could have been, considering that he would have heard the same lectures from 
the same professors and studied the same books in the same library.139 However, the court 
recognized that interaction with other students is an essential aspect of education, and that 
McLaurin would be unfairly (and unconstitutionally) denied this interaction.140 Any theoretical 
possibility of a segregated school’s passing constitutional muster that was left open by Sweatt 
was closed by McLaurin.141 If interaction with other students is an essential part of education, 
such that denying an equal opportunity to interact means denying an equal education, then 
 
133 Compare Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-551, with Gaines, 305 U.S. at 349, 353. 
134 See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632-636. 
135 See id.
136 See id. at 633-634. 
137 See id.
138 See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 638-642. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. at 640-641. 
141 See McLaurin, 339 U.S. 637; Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629. 
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segregation is inherently unconstitutional, because the effect (indeed, the purpose) of segregation 
is to prevent interaction between students of different races.  When we consider Sweatt’s 
recognition that the “position and influence” of a school’s alumni is an essential element of its 
quality, it becomes clear that segregated schools disadvantaged African-American students.142 
After McLaurin, there was only a short conceptual step to Brown v. The Board of Education.143 
Brown formally declared that segregated schools are inherently unequal.144 Brown 
justified its departure from Plessy on the grounds that social conditions had changed.145 First, 
Brown noted that public education was far more important in 1954 than it had been at the time of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage (1868) or even at the time of Plessy (1896).146 
Compulsory education, which dramatically increased the importance of high-quality public 
education, was not adopted by every state until 1918.147 Second, Brown cites a series of 
psychological studies arguing that segregation harmed the self-esteem of African-American 
students.148 The validity of those studies has been vigorously attacked,149 but what is more 
important for my purpose is the implicit recognition that society’s willingness to tolerate attacks 
on the self-esteem of African Americans had changed: in other words, the regard for others had 
changed.  As the regard for others shifted, Plessy, which had probably never been efficient, 
became ever more palpably inefficient.  The Plessy court responded to the argument that 
segregation was intended to degrade African Americans with a callous statement that it was only 
insulting “if the colored race chooses that construction” — implicitly stating, “That’s your 
problem: deal with it.”150 Brown recognized that the regard for others had shifted, such that the 
possibility that African-American students’ self-esteem suffered from segregation was counted 
as a loss both the students and to others, implying a right to not be exposed to the loss. 
 
142 See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634. 
143 Brown v. The Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
144Id. at 493. 
145 See id. at 492-493. 
146 See id.
147 See id. at 490. 
148 See id. at 494-495. 
149 Indeed, many of the authors of these studies retracted their findings.   
150 See id. Justice Harlan, in contrast, recognized that “everyone knows” that the purpose of the Louisiana 
statute was to degrade African Americans. See id. at 556-557. 
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C.  A CHANGE IN TECHNOLOGY: WITH RAPID CHANGE, CUSTOM AND INTELLECTUAL 
KNOWLEDGE MAY BE INSUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE EFFICIENCY 
The example is a Wisconsin case involving restriction to sunlight.  This examples shows how 
difficult in can be for courts to determine what is efficient under changing conditions.151 
Sunlight and the Law of Nuisance 
Prah v. Maretti involved a dispute about whether the defendant committed a nuisance when he 
obstructed the plaintiff’s access to sunlight.152 The plaintiff, Prah, had built a system using solar 
collectors to provide his house with heat and hot water.153 The defendant, Maretti, then 
purchased property adjacent to Prah’s began to build a home there.154 Prah argued that Maretti’s 
construction would prevent him from receiving enough sunlight to get adequate use from his 
solar collectors, and that Maretti committed a nuisance by interfering with his access to sunlight.  
Maretti argued that, under Wisconsin law, one could not commit a nuisance simply by 
obstructing his neighbor’s access to sunlight.155 That is, in essence, Maretti argued that 
Wisconsin denied standing to plaintiffs seeking access to sunlight.156 The majority of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that — in the past — courts had consistently denied 
standing to such plaintiffs, but decided to overrule that line of cases, and granted standing to such 
plaintiffs.157 
In an era of rapid social change it is also possible for judges to overreact to social change, 
and to change the law even though the new social values do not justify a change in the law.  The 
 
151 Another example may be found (Zerbe, 2001, pp.69f) in Richard Posner’s decision in Lorenzen v. 
Employees Retirement Plan of the Sperry & Hutchison Co.,699 F. Supp. 1367 (E.D. Wis. 1988), rev’d 
896 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1990). 
152 See Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Wis. 1982). 
153 See id.  
154 See id. at 185 (noting that Maretti had received permission to build his home from both the subdivision 
and the city). 
155 See id. at 188-189.  Before Prah, the only way to acquire a protectable interest in sunlight under the 
common law was to convince one’s neighbor to give him an express easement for sunlight.  See id. An 
easement is essentially a contract between two landowners, which either grants one person the right to 
use another person’s land in some limited way, or which prevents a person from using his own land in a 
particular way.  See id. In this particular case, Prah and Maretti attempted to negotiate an agreement 
but were unable to reach a compromise.  See id. at 185. 
156 See id. at 184. 
157 See id. at 189. 
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judges may overestimate the extent or importance of the social change. Prah is an example of a 
case in which the majority appears to have overreacted to a social change.158 
Under the law of nuisance, a person cannot unreasonably interfere with another person’s 
ability to enjoy his or her property.159 In a typical nuisance action, the defendant is using his or 
her land in a way that is inconvenient or annoying to the plaintiff.160 The plaintiff must first 
show that he or she is not a “hypersensitive” landowner.161 If the defendant’s conduct is only 
disruptive to the plaintiff because the plaintiff is unusually sensitive or vulnerable, the 
defendant’s conduct is not a nuisance, even if the plaintiff is suffering extreme economic losses 
as a result.162 
If a court concludes that the plaintiff is not hypersensitive, the court then goes on to 
compare the utility of the defendant’s conduct with the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff.163 
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 827, the factors to be considered in measuring the 
gravity of the plaintiff’s harm include: (a) the extent of the harm involved; (b) the character of 
the harm involved;164 (c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment 
invaded; (d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character of the 
locality; and (e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.  The factors to be 
considered in measuring the utility of the defendant’s conduct include (a) the social value that 
the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct; (b) the suitability of the conduct to the 
character of the locality; and (c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion 
(Restatement (Second) of Torts § 828). 
 
158 See id. at 194 (dissenting opinion).   
159 See id. at 187. 
160 See id.
161 See id. at 197 (dissenting opinion). 
162 See id.
163 See id. at 187. 
164 By “character of the harm” the Restatement means that nuisances that cause physical damage to a 
structure on real property are in general more serious than personal discomfort or annoyance.  The 
Restatement’s justification for treating physical damage as more important than those that cause 
personal discomfort is that the former is much easier to prove than the latter.  If the Restatement is 
simply making a prediction that plaintiffs will be successful more often when they produce evidence of 
physical damage to their property, because physical damage is easier to prove than discomfort, this 
distinction is sensible.  If the Restatement is making a prescription that preventing or reimbursing 
people for personal discomfort be treated as less important than preventing or reimbursing physical 
damage, even when the economic injury (WTA or WTP) is the same, that distinction is not sensible.  
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The Restatement’s approach to nuisance law is consistent with KHM’s approach to 
benefit-cost analysis.  To determine the plaintiff’s WTA or WTP, we need to know both the 
seriousness of the harm caused by the defendant and the plaintiff’s opportunity cost.  Similarly, 
to determine the defendant’s WTA or WTP, we need to know both the value of his conduct to 
him and his opportunity cost.  The Restatement asks us to consider both the value of the 
defendant’s conduct to the two parties and their opportunity costs, allowing us to determine their 
WTP and WTA. 
Furthermore, the Restatement’s consideration of whether the plaintiff’s use or the 
defendant’s use is more consistent with the neighborhood helps determine the opportunity costs 
of each, especially when the best way to avoid the injury is for one of the parties to move.  It is 
probably more efficient to make a person change his or her lifestyle to fit the needs of the 
neighborhood (either by moving or by adopting some measure that reduces the harm of the 
invasion) than to make the whole neighborhood change to fit the needs of one party. 
The Restatement also incorporates moral sentiments by considering the social value that 
the law attaches to the plaintiff’s use and the defendant’s use.  If society attaches “value” to 
ensuring that the plaintiff wins and the defendant loses, then the regard for others favors giving 
the right to the plaintiff.  Similarly, if society is willing to pay or willing to accept payment to 
ensure that the defendant wins, the regard for others is in favor of the defendant. 
If a nuisance is proved, the plaintiff is typically entitled to damages for the past 
interference and an injunction against future interference.165 Injunctions are available to 
plaintiffs who have suffered irreparable injuries — that is, injuries for which merely damages 
would be inadequate.166 Because the law views each parcel of land as unique, an injury to land is 
often deemed to be irreparable.167 
Even if the plaintiff cannot convince the court that the defendant’s use is a nuisance, the 
plaintiff can prevent the harm by convincing the defendant to grant a restrictive easement or a 
covenant.168 On the other hand, if something is held to be a nuisance, the defendant can purchase 
 
Whether an injury has been proved is a separate issue from the weight that should be given to an injury 
once it has been proved.   
165 See id. at 184. 
166 See Stokes Cty. Soil Conservation Dist. v. Shelton, 67 N.C. App. 728 (1984). 
167 See United Church of the Med. Ctr. v. Medical Ctr. Comm’n, 689 F.2d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 1982). 
168 See Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 188. Easements or covenants are special types of agreements.  They are 
essentially contracts in which a party either agrees to allow another person to use his property, or agrees 
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from the plaintiff the right to continue committing the nuisance.  Therefore, the consequence of a 
court declaring that something is not a nuisance is that the invasion will continue unless the 
plaintiff’s WTP is higher than the defendant’s WTA, after transactions costs.  On the other hand, 
the consequence of a court declaring that something is a nuisance is that the invasion will not 
continue unless the defendant’s WTP is higher than the plaintiff’s WTA, after transactions costs.  
Because the WTA is higher than the WTP for normal goods, declaring something to be a 
nuisance increases the odds that the activity will be stopped, but it does not guarantee it.169 
Interestingly enough, historically, plaintiffs seeking access to sunlight had previously 
been denied standing because the law of nuisance recognized three broad social policies that 
were widely accepted in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that, if true, would justify 
the denial of standing.170 
First, there was a widespread belief that a landowner should be able to put his land to 
any use he wished, so long as he did not cause physical damage to a neighbor.171 If a plaintiff 
could stop the defendant from developing his property simply to ensure the plaintiff’s access to 
sunlight, society would feel that the defendant was being treated unfairly, and this sense of 
unfairness would cause society to experience a loss due to the regard for others. 
Second, sunlight was valued only for its aesthetic qualities to its owner, and it was 
thought that the owner could acquire equivalent illumination through artificial devices.172 In 
other words, it was believed that the plaintiff seeking sunlight had a low WTA and WTP, 
because sunlight was of relatively little value and the opportunity costs of purchasing artificial 
light was relatively low. 
 Third, society had a significant interest in encouraging property development.173 The 
United States was in the middle of a growth period that was almost universally viewed as 
necessary to its future.  That is, economic growth or development as defined by market goods 
 
not to use his own property in a certain manner.  The law of property sometimes creates an easement or 
covenant even when there is no express agreement (such as an easement by prescription).   
169 The finding of a nuisance also has a distributive effect, because the plaintiff’s wealth is increased at the 
expense of the defendant.  The plaintiff’s wealth will increase because either a harmful activity will be 
prevented, or the plaintiff will receive a sum of money that is at least as valuable to him as preventing 
the activity. 
170 See Prah, at 189-190. 
171 See id.
172 See id.
173 See id.
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was highly valued relative to non-market amenities.  It was believed that American society 
experienced a significant gain whenever U.S. land was developed, and that judges would inflict a 
loss on society if they recognized a right to sunlight and allowed plaintiffs to prevent 
development.  In other words, the United States had a direct interest in encouraging 
development, and experienced a gain when development was allowed. 
The Prah court concluded that a series of social changes had occurred in the late 
twentieth century that undermined the three social goals outlined above.174 First, sunlight had 
become something more than just an aesthetic luxury; it had become an energy source.175 
Therefore, the value of sunlight to the plaintiff is likely to be higher than it was before.  
Furthermore, the opportunity cost of losing sunlight is higher, because one cannot generate solar 
energy artificially.  Artificial devices can provide illumination, but they cannot be used to 
generate electrical energy. 
Second, the value of non-market amenities had grown relative to traditional market 
growth since the nineteenth century.  Today, society is less willing to encourage traditional 
market growth at the expense of environmental and other amenities.176 
Third, the United States is rapidly depleting its supply of fossil fuels, and significant 
public policy has been aimed at experimenting with and developing alternative energy 
sources.177 Therefore, allowing the plaintiff to develop solar energy would likely result in a 
direct benefit to American society, because it lessens the burden on fossil fuels. 
Fourth, American attitudes toward property owners have changed, and few Americans 
still believe that a landowners should have a completely unrestricted right to develop their 
property.178 Today, Americans regard a relatively large degree of regulation of land use as 
reasonable, even when one has not physically injured his neighbor’s property.  Therefore, the 
regard for others is less likely to favor allowing a defendant to use his property in a way that 
obstructs sunlight, even if the defendant is not causing a physical harm to the plaintiff’s property. 
 In light of those four changes, the court concluded that it was no longer reasonable to 
assume that it was in America’s best interests to deny standing to plaintiffs seeking access to 
 
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See id.
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sunlight.179 Therefore, it is efficient to grant standing to people seeking access, so that a court 
can determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular plaintiff’s need for sunlight is 
greater than a particular defendant’s need for development.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
remanded, directing the trial court to consider the factors specified in the Restatement to 
determine whether Maretti’s construction actually constitutes a nuisance.180 
Judge Callow argued in dissent that the court should continue to deny standing to 
plaintiffs seeking access to sunlight.181 He made three arguments to support his conclusion.  
First, he argued that the state legislature is in a better position than the courts to determine 
whether there has been a change in the regard for others.182 Therefore, the courts should 
continue to deny standing to plaintiffs seeking access to sunlight until the legislature grants this 
right to plaintiffs.  In fact, he noted that the legislature had actually drafted a statute that 
governed one’s right to sunlight, and argued that the court was wrong to ignore that statute.183 
Under the statute, one who builds a solar collector can prevent a neighbor from blocking his 
access to sunlight only if the plaintiff received a solar access permit from the state before the 
defendant received a permit to build his house from the local subdivision and the city.184 In this 
case, Prah apparently had never received a permit from Wisconsin, and Prah did not notify 
Maretti that he had built a solar plant until after Maretti had received a building permit from the 
local subdivision and the city.185 Therefore, under the recently adopted Wisconsin statute, Prah 
had no right to prevent Maretti’s construction.186 
Callow’s argument that the judiciary should let the legislature decide what is in the public 
interest and what the regard for others favors is a common argument, but it is not self-evidently 
correct.  In this case, however, the legislature actually had acted, and it had drafted a statute 
striking a balance between the interests of solar power users and the interests of people who 
wished to develop their property.  The legislature’s “first in time” approach to the issue of 
 
179 Id.
180 See id. at 192. 
181 See id. at 193-199. 
182 See id. at 195. 
183 See id. at 195-196. 
184 See id.
185 See id. 
186 See id.
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conflicts between solar power users and other landowners is a reasonable one, and the majority 
probably should have at least considered it.187 
Second, Callow argued, in essence, that courts should only recognize the regard for 
others in an action alleging a public nuisance, not a private nuisance.188 Callow’s argument is 
not a persuasive one, at least under KHM analysis.  The regard for others would probably be 
more strongly opposed to a defendant who committed a public nuisance than it is opposed to a 
defendant who committed a private nuisance, but there is no reason to ignore the regard for 
others in private nuisance actions.  If the regard for others is ignored in private nuisance actions, 
courts would frequently reach inefficient decisions, under KHM’s definition of efficiency; to 
ignore a class of sentiments that represents a WTP for a result will lead to inefficiency where the 
WTP is of sufficient magnitude to reach a different conclusion.  Such a conclusion would then be 
not only inefficient but unjust.  
 Third, Callow argued that even if solar power is of greater value today than it was in the 
nineteenth century, and even if the regard for others favors plaintiffs in Prah’s position, it is still 
true that Prah is a hypersensitive plaintiff, and thus it is still efficient to deny standing to Prah.189 
Callow notes that whether a plaintiff is hypersensitive is largely a question of relative 
numbers.190 A hypersensitive plaintiff is a plaintiff who is bothered by something that most 
people would not find bothersome.191 It may be true that Prah is engaging in a socially useful 
activity by experimenting in solar energy, but the fact remains that most people would not have 
been bothered by Maretti’s construction.192 Judge Callow analogized to the history of the law’s 
treatment of horses and cars.193 When the car was first invented, it was frequently held to be a 
 
187 In addition, the legislature’s rule might have reduced the transactions costs of both those seeking 
access to sunlight and those seeking the right to build a home on their property.  Whether a person holds 
a solar access permit is publicly available information.  Under the legislature’s approach, it would be 
relatively easy for solar power users to express their need for sunlight, by requesting a permit.  
Similarly, it would be relatively easy for people who wish to build a home to find out whether any of 
their neighbors had a permit.  By thwarting the legislature’s approach, the court makes it more difficult 
for people like Maretti to find out whether any of their neighbors has a particularly intense need for 
sunlight. 
188 See Prah at 194-195.  
189 See id. at 196-197.  
190 See id. at 195. 
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See id.
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nuisance to horses.194 Many more people owned horses than owned cars, and thus it made sense 
to require car owners to restructure their lives to reduce the impact on horses, rather than 
requiring horse owners to restructure their lives to suit car owners.195 Later, when cars became 
commonplace, the horse was held to be a nuisance.196 Callow suggests that solar energy is still 
in such an early stage of development that solar energy users like Prah are hypersensitive, while 
home-builders like Maretti are behaving reasonably.197 
Callow’s third argument is highly persuasive.  The majority is almost certainly correct in arguing 
that society’s attitude toward the value of sunlight has changed,198 but Callow is almost certainly 
correct in responding that society has not changed enough to justify a new legal rule.199 Despite 
the social changes that the majority discusses, the fact remains that the vast majority of 
homeowners in Wisconsin would not be bothered by Maretti’s construction, because the vast 
majority of homeowners in Wisconsin do not rely on solar power for heat and hot water.  
Therefore, solar power users like Prah are hypersensitive.  While society has changed, society 
has not changed enough to make solar energy use more widespread.  Just as the car eventually 
succeeded the horse, it may be that solar energy will eventually become so valuable that one who 
desires access to sunlight would not be considered hypersensitive.  However, it seems unlikely 
that Wisconsin had reached that point in 1980, and thus the majority’s decision was premature.200 
XI.  CONCLUSION 
The argument presented here suggests that the considerable and long-standing debate about both 
the predictive and normative roles of economic efficiency on the one hand and justice on the 
other is misplaced..  Economic efficiency, properly presented as KHM, is justice, where justice is 
seen as legitimate expectations arising from rights and norms. Thus, the article suggests a reason 
for the efficiency of common law rooted in the search for justice.201 Efficiency and justice 
 
194 See id.
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 See id.
198 See id. at 188-189. 
199 See id. at 197. 
200 Id.
201 This view will allow judges and other scholars who wish to rely on economic efficiency to 
understand that they are also relying on principles of justice.  It will allow economists to 
realize more fully the inherently normative nature of efficiency, and that efficiency needs not 
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correspond and judges seek justice as a consequence of a social norm. For both economists and 
judges, if their arguments seem incorrect when reformulated with either justice or efficiency 
language, they were properly originally formulated incorrectly. 
 Judges find justice and efficiency in custom and intellectual knowledge.  As technology, 
sentiments and knowledge change the law can become incomplete and/or unfit and thus 
inefficient.  Judges seek to improve the efficiency of the law by incorporating custom and 
intellectual knowledge.  As conditions change rapidly, however, these may be in short supply 
and the common law will be less efficient.  
The thesis is developed through several examples.  One shows efficient judge-made 
changes in antitrust law through the incorporation of intellectual knowledge.  The examples of 
slavery and dueling show that KHM is a better approach to understanding change than KH. The 
examples of access to sunlight and racial equality show how difficult it can be to determine 
either efficiency or justice when there is neither sufficient custom nor knowledge. As Simpson 
notes, justice and efficiency are a matter of recourse to the conscience of the community 
(Simpson, 1990).202 One way to look at the evolution of common law is to note that common law 
tends toward fairness and justice; efficiency is a by-product.203 
be seen as attached to selfish behavior; moral sentiments are also a consistent part of 
efficiency.  Judges and others that wish to use the language of justice can reformulate their 
arguments to relate to economic efficiency.
202 Simpson’s (1990) discussion of the Mignonette shipwreck gives us an example where the court would 
have preferred the destruction of four lives through starvation to the destruction of one life through 
cannibalism. This is clearly “inefficient” in the sense of the destruction of greater human capital, but it 
is not necessarily inefficient in a KHM sense.  Whether this outcome is inefficient in a KHM sense 
depends on where rights and sentiments lie.  In other words, if the regard for others finds cannibalism 
sufficiently appalling, it might be more efficient to sacrifice four lives to starvation than to sacrifice one 
life to cannibalism. 
203 See Easterling (1992) for an analysis in which efficiency contributes to fairness. 
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